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This paper offers a defense of scientific realism against one central anti-realist argument,
the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI). More specifically, this paper initially considers and rejects
an oft-stated version of the PMI, arguing that the historical sample size is insufficient to make
any serious induction, optimistic or pessimistic, about the likelihood of current scientific theories
being abandoned. After demonstrating the deficiency of the initially considered PMI, the paper
takes into account a possible amendment to the PMI which could circumvent such sample-size
worries, but then concludes that even this amended version of the PMI does not offer sufficient
warrant for abandoning scientific realism. Before diving headlong into these arguments against
the PMI, it will be helpful to review the general realist and antirealist positions that stake out the
terms of the debate.
Anjan Chakravartty offers a general characterization of scientific realism when he states
“Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude towards the content of our best theories and
models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world
described by the sciences” (Chakravartty, 2011) (for the remainder of the paper I will refer to
scientific realism and scientific anti-realism simply as realism and anti-realism. Any reference to
other forms of realism or anti-realism will be explicitly noted). In connection, realism stakes
predictable claims in historically fundamental philosophical debates. For instance, realists are
overwhelming likely to reject idealism and embrace the existence of a mind-independent external
world. But realism goes beyond a belief in the mundane ontic furniture of everyday life (e.g.,
trees, bees, bricks, cars), beyond a rejection of radical skepticism. It also endorses belief in
mature, successful scientific theories whether they describe our mundane ontic furniture or
whether they describe unobservables with which humanity has traditionally been unfamiliar
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(unobservables being those entities that cannot be perceived under favorable circumstances by a
person with normal functioning sense organs).
Though the realist position appears relatively straightforward, as it simply requires belief
in the products of good science, there is significant room for variation among realists. Realists
disagree about which theories are adequately mature and what constitutes a theory being
approximately true. Additionally, the introduction of structural realism, the claim that only the
underlying mathematical structure of mature theories should be regarded as real (in contrast to
the unobservable entities), has further complicated the debate.1
More than the subject of debate in realist circles, anti-realists attempt to exploit the
ambiguities of the realist position, particularly the notion of approximate truth, to strengthen
their own claims (see Laudan, 1981). These conversations, while meaningful and interesting,
require treatment of their own, and will not be the subject of this paper. In what follows one
should assume I make reference to a sort of garden-variety realism in which both the
mathematical structure and the entities described by our current best theories are approximately
true representations of the world and that both the concept of approximate truth and maturity are
sufficiently clear for the realist’s purposes. Further, truth should be should be understood as a
correspondence to fact, where true statements are those that correctly describe external reality, as
opposed to a pragmatist or coherentist understandings of truth. With these qualifications in mind,
we can consider the case for realism.
The most powerful and influential arguments for realism are motivated by the theory’s
explanatory power, with realists claiming that other theories do not adequately explain the
success of science. One leading formulation of this appeal to explanatory power is the no
miracles argument (NMA), made famous by Hilary Putnam. The NMA claims that scientific
1

For an at-length discussion of structural realism see Worrall, 1989 and Ladyman, 1998.
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realism “is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle” (Putnam,
1975: 73). By pointing to the success of our current theories realists argue that the truth of such
theories is overwhelmingly likely. Such successes include the manipulation of the phenotypical
properties of organisms, the engineering of atomic weapons, the development of effective
medicine, and the ability to make highly accurate predictions about a wide variety of phenomena.
If it were the not case that our scientific theories about these subjects were at least approximately
true, their ability to make accurate predictions and facilitate continued successes would be a truly
incredible coincidence, a coincidence on par or exceeding that of an individual consistently
picking winning lottery numbers. Much of the motivation for realism comes from the intuition
that the invocation of such a coincidence is insufficient to explain science’s success. The realist’s
alternative is to assume that such a coincidence does not exist and that out current theories are
mostly true.
This appeal, an appeal to the seeming unlikelihood of current scientific theories being
successful on the basis of a miracle, has at its roots abductive reasoning, or inference to the best
explanation (IBE). A general description of IBE provided by Peter Lipton describes the process
as “Beginning with the evidence available to us, we infer what would, if true, provide the best
explanation of the evidence” (Lipton, 1991: 1). While it may be surprisingly difficult to give a
principled or systematized account of IBE, in which it is clearly delineated what constitutes the
basis of a “best explanation”, the practice is ubiquitous and unavoidable. This ubiquitous method
of inference forms much of the basis of not only philosophy and the sciences, but everyday
existence. For instance, if I venture outside during a Tacoma November with overcast skies and
see that the pavement is wet, it is not reasonable to infer that the firemen down the street decided
to go for a joy ride with their hoses on, soaking everything in sight. This inference is
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unreasonable because it does not best explain the available evidence (if I had seen such a joy
ride, the case would be different). The hypothesis that explains the evidence best is something to
the effect of “it has rained recently”, even though this hypothesis is not guaranteed to be true.
Such inferences are fundamental to our decision-making and behavior, and forsaking such a
powerful logical tool, even if only in a specific domain, requires powerful arguments. Of course,
few anti-realists purport to make such a rejection. Part of the task of this paper is to demonstrate
that, in the case of science, they do, and that such a rejection is unreasonable unless independent
arguments can demonstrate the deficiency of abduction in the case of anti-realism. Until such
arguments are made, it would seem the anti-realist ignores a valuable, even crucial, logical tool
when making their claims.
Before describing anti-realism and its incarnations motivated by the PMI, it is important
to note that realism does not entail the claim that our current scientific theories are absolutely
true with no room for revision. As mentioned previously, most realists take a more qualified
stance when defending the position. Science is argued to be approximately true, with room for
development and reevaluation. For instance, science can certainly add knowledge within the
existing framework, as with mapping of a new genome. Even fundamental theories and
assumptions might be recontextualized in the light of new discoveries or more effective
frameworks, as was arguably the case in the shift from Newtonian to Relativistic mechanics, in
which Newtonian mechanics describes those objects in Relativistic mechanics which have
“medium masses” and move at “medium” speeds. 2 However, the realist maintains it is unlikely
that the fundamental positions in science will be abandoned wholesale or found to be totally
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Obviously, some objects that we might regard as very massive or very fast can still be accurately explained with
Newtonian mechanics. Here we should take “medium” to mean those objects neither massive nor fast enough to be
significantly effected by either general or special relativity (or small enough to be significantly effected by quantum
mechanics).
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misguided. Rather, they point in the right direction, even if there is ambiguity in the details or
new ways of framing scientific questions.
Scientific anti-realism is the rejection of such a positive epistemic stance towards science
and its theories. Broadly speaking, there are many motivations for anti-realism.. Of the
assortment of anti-realist arguments, two of the most popular have been the constructive
empiricism of Bas van Frassen (van Frassen, 1980) and worries about the underdetermination of
theories, a concern historically associated with Pierre Duhem (Duhem, 1906) and Wilard van
Orman Quine (Quine, 1953). While these anti-realist arguments may or may not be convincing
(I, in fact, find them lacking), for the purposes of this paper they can largely be set to the side
while attention is paid to a third anti-realist motivation, the pessimistic meta-induction. It is
worth noting that while constructive empiricism, underdetermination, and the PMI can all be
dealt with in separate conversations, there can also be substantial overlap, with each argument
informing the others and each sharing similar motivation. This overlap is particularly evident in
the work of van Frassen, who argues that observable evidence underdetermines the unobservable
entities posited by science. It can also be seen in the work of Kyle Stanford (Stanford, 2006),
who has recently worked to combine the historicist tack of the PMI with traditional
underdetermination worries. Nevertheless, the boundaries of the PMI are sufficiently clear to
allow for treatment on its own; what follows is the appraisal of that particular anti-realist
strategy.
Proponents of the PMI argue that the empirical success of past scientific theories is in no
meaningful way tied to their being true. In fact, most such theories contain theoretical elements
currently regarded as patently false and posited entities regarded as non-existent. As such, we
can perform an induction over the long history of science to conclude that our current theories
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are likely to be abandoned and that their empirical success is not a barometer for truth-likelihood.
Laudan provides a list of such empirically successful yet abandoned theories, reproduced below:
- the crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy;
- the humoral theory of medicine;
- the effluvial theory of static electricity;
- 'catastrophist' geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachian) deluge;
- the phlogiston theory of chemistry;
- the caloric theory of heat;
- the vibratory theory of heat;
- the vital force theories of physiology;
- the electromagnetic aether;
- the optical aether;
- the theory of circular inertia;
- theories of spontaneous generation. (Laudan, 1981: 33)

Given such a lengthy array of abandoned theories, which Laudan claims he can augment ad
nauseum, the intuitions behind the PMI are clear enough: it would require a sort of inductive
misstep to assume current science had it right while others who had made similar claims were
proven incorrect time and time again. Better to adopt the anti-realist stance and assume our
current theories will be abandoned and are likely not even approximately true.
My argument against the PMI is straightforward. It is simply that the historical record, by
itself, does not offer the sufficiently large or unambiguous sample required for making serious
inductions about the future of sciences’ current best theories. Initially, this may appear to be a
bold claim. It is easy to imagine objections pointing out that the history of science is hundreds or
thousands of years old, as long or longer than the historical record that economists, sociologists,
and historians use to level many of their claims. Given that the methodology and explanatory
power of these disciplines is widely trusted, we should trust a historicist analysis of science as
well. Laudan, after all, provides a substantial list with which to perform an induction. It might
even be argued that the length of sciences’ historical record is a strong virtue for the PMI, that
few other samples map change over such an extended length of time, and that consequently we
should be more confident in the PMI than most other theories.
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These objections are misguided for a number of reasons. First, the quality of a sample for
making predictions is not determined by a quantitative measure of the time over which the
sample was collected. Other criteria, including the amount of possible confounding variables, the
amount of data collected over that sample, the complexity of the examined phenomenon, and the
number of successful tests, play essential roles in determining the predictive power we should
come to expect from a theory. This can be illustrated through a number of examples, some
hypothetical, others factual.
We can imagine circumstances which make it apparent that the amount of time a theory
has enjoyed empirical success is less important than other features supporting a theory. For
instance, consider a hypothetical theory A, which has enjoyed the success of making correct
predictions over 500 years. However, theory A might only have been genuinely tested three
times. That the theory has only had three opportunities for confirmation or falsification should
weigh on us more than the fact that those opportunities occurred over a 500 year period. If a
falsifying case did come along, say on the fourth test, the length of time the theory enjoyed
predictive success, by itself, should not play a significant role in deciding whether to keep or
abandoning the theory. This is not to say that the amount of time that a theory enjoys success
cannot influence the other factors that play a significant role in theory choice. More time yields
more opportunities for tests, for instance. But when individuals speak of the predictive success of
a theory over many years, it is more an implicit appeal to the amount of successful tests of the
theory, tests occurring frequently over a long period of time, than to the length of time
supporting a theory taken in isolation. So, those who regard theory A as a unfailing guide to what
to expect in the future might be likened to those who would make serious future predictions
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about the flip of a coin after three flips on tails, citing as evidence in their favor that those flips
occurred over hundreds of years. 3
The PMI should be imagined as analogous to theory A. The sample size of abandoned
theories, when one takes a critical view towards the anti-realist’s list, does not, by itself, provide
a sufficient sample of past abandoned theories to warrant the claim that we should expect current
science to be regarded as distant from the truth. For example, we might question the true
scientific credentials of the astronomical crystalline spheres theory, the humoral theory of
medicine, effluvial theory of electricity, ‘catastrophist' theories of geology, the vital force
theories of physiology, the theory of circular inertia, and theories of spontaneous generation. As
it is far beyond the scope of this paper to deliberate about each of these theories’ scientific
shortcomings individually, a brief group consideration will have to suffice. In short, each of
these theories, while containing some sort of explanatory power, were unsuccessful by any
reasonable standard in that they failed to make predictions beyond the patently obvious. For
example, it would be trivial for me to count the prediction that “a thrown object will move in the
direction it is thrown” in favor of the theory of circular inertia as such a prediction is also
entailed solely by common sense. This is not the stuff which allows for the engineering of
airplanes, the isolation of gases, the production of atomic weapons or the prediction of novel
events. As such, we should refrain from calling them scientific theories, which we should
demand make novel, precise predictions and do not merely have readily apparent observational
phenomena built into them.
Keeping in mind that that the length of time over which a theory has enjoyed success
should not, by itself, be a significant factor in determining the value of said theory, how might
3

The flip of a coin might be a misleading analogy, as it carries along with it the implicit assumption that the
probability of each flip is 50%. A better analog might be some sort of number generator, random or not, and
regarding the first three of its outputs as indicative of what to expect in the future.
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we evaluate the PMI? The inductive base provided by Laudan has been trimmed significantly,
though some successful, yet abandoned, theories remain. However, even if we suppose that such
theories were not approximately true despite their success, we can question the soundness of the
PMI. Especially with the trimmed sample trimmed to truly scientific theories, the PMI begins to
resemble theory A, a theory with success over hundreds of years, but only a very small sample of
tests over that period. We might then infer that we do not have a sample sizable enough to induce
that current scientific theories will be abandoned. Rather, such a limited sample recommends
agnosticism about the issue; it is simply unclear, given only the historical record, whether our
current theories will be largely abandoned and considered false or retained indefinitely and
considered approximately true. We might also ask at what point the pessimistic induction
becomes unreasonable: after theories have enjoyed well-tested success for a 100 years? 500? Or
will the existence of such counter-examples always be sufficient to leverage the argument, even
if science were to continue indefinitely without any major theory changes?
However, there is still an a-historical warrant for endorsing realism, namely, the NMA.
The realist need not make any appeals to the historical record of science to leverage their appeals
to the explanatory power of realism (although such appeals are by no means incompatible with
realism, and may even strengthen the case). All the realist must point to is current science. If
such science successful, then the models used to produce such successes are presumably true
descriptions of reality, barring a sort of miracle; no reference to the past need be made. This is in
contrast to advocates of the PMI, who must appeal to the historical record to leverage their
claims. As such, if the historical record is taken as insufficient to leverage claims regarding the
likelihood that current empirically successful theories will be abandoned the proponents of the
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PMI lose much of their ground, while realists may still use current science to make appeals to
explanatory power of their view. This appraisal seems to favor the realist.
Nevertheless, as it stands the argument leaves substantial room for the anti-realist to
maneuver. If it is admitted that there are examples of even a few non-approximately true but
empirically successful theories, as the above argument allows, the anti-realist can make a
convincing case against the linchpin of the realist position, the NMA. By pointing to such
examples, the anti-realist can give counter-examples to the NMA, providing cases in which
science was admittedly not approximately true, yet still successful. This is precisely the sort of
miraculous occurrence the realist wishes to deny, and such counterexamples certainly strains the
credibility of the realist who maintains such a possibility is hugely unlikely (Note, however, that
the realist can maintain her position without any explicit contradiction. Just because an event is
unlikely does not preclude it from happening, nor does it preclude it from happening very
frequently over a period of time). To continue to assert that the NMA can function unscathed in
light of such worries might reasonably be seen as begging the question against the anti-realist.
The realist has answers to such claims. This is to claim that genuinely successful
abandoned theories were, in fact, approximately true and that the theoretical aspects of
abandoned theories which were crucial for their success were carried over to future theories,
while it was only theoretically inaccurate portions which were abandoned (see Psillos, 1999:
108-143 and Kitcher, 1993: 127-177). For instance, the shift from Newtonian mechanics to
Relativist mechanics was not an abandonment of Newtonian mechanics per se, but rather the
relocation of a largely correct theory into a broader framework, in which it is a limiting case.
Similarly, in the case of the caloric theory of heat, Psillos claims “the cause of heat as a material
fluid was not as central, unquestioned, and supported as, for instance, Laudan, has claimed” and
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that “the empirical success of the caloric theory was not essentially dependent on claims
concerning the existence of an imponderable fluid which caused the rise (or fall) of temperature
by being absorbed (given away) by a body” (Psillos: 113, 115-130). Psillos makes a similar point
about dynamical optical ether theories, demonstrating that the supposition of such an ether was
not central to the theory’s success and that the optical laws generated could function
independently of such theoretical suppositions (Psillos: 114, 130-145). Given such theoretical
carryover, it is reasonable to call such theories approximately true and to claim they describe
portions of the world in meaningful ways, even if such descriptions were not perfectly accurate
and later superceded by improved theories. With such arguments in hand, the realist might
confidently assert that successful but abandoned theories were approximately true, and that
proving otherwise becomes the burden of the anti-realist.
Perhaps these answers to the PMI are convincing, perhaps not. However, another answer
to the PMI that is often overlooked, perhaps ironically, as it is firmly rooted in the central tenant
of science discussed previously, is inference to the best explanation. According to this answer we
might assume that our previous answer failed in some cases (or perhaps all cases), that there was
not significant theoretical carry-over between truly successful, mature theories and that some (or
all) past mature theories were not even approximately true even though they were empirically
successful (again, to emphasize, this is not the view I think most prudent, but for the sake of the
following answer it is an illustrative assumption). Even then, the realist might still leverage a
convincing argument utilizing inference to the best information. The case goes as follows: even
if these past theories were untrue, it does not follow that anyone was misguided in thinking them
true or that we are wrong for believing in the truth of our current theories. Realism, after all, is
rooted in an inference to the best explanation and any inference to the best explanation will not
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be perfectly infallible; we can never conclusively prove such inferences true as we can with
sentences in a deductive system. However, this does not discredit inference to the best
explanation as a reliable tool for describing reality in the vast majority of circumstances.
Abandoning it in response to a few failed attempts of its use would be an extreme overreaction.
Rather, it should continue to be embraced, as it generally offers a mostly correct description of
events.
To make the point clear, imagine circumstances in which you are playing baseball, only
to turn around to briefly glimpse another baseball hurtling at your face before falling
unconscious. Upon awakening, it is reasonable to infer that you were hit in the head with a ball,
which subsequently knocked you out. In fact, this seems extraordinarily likely, given the
information at your disposal. The inference that a ball hit your head is the inference to the best
explanation. Nevertheless, it is impossible to guarantee with absolute certainty that this was the
case. It is also possible that you were struck by lightening moments before the ball would have
struck you, knocking you unconscious before the ball contacted with your head. Such
circumstances are extremely unlikely, but metaphysically possible. And one would not be
unreasonable in believing strongly that you were knocked unconscious by the ball, even though
fate conspired against such circumstances. Additionally, one would not be reasonable if, faced
with the identical or similar circumstances after the initial occurrence, they assumed they had
again been struck by lightening. Rather, one should assume it was the ball, even if one had been
incorrect in their reasonable judgment in the first occurrence. After all, the event of being struck
by lightening in similar circumstances for a second time is still enormously unlikely and being
foiled by exceptional circumstances when using a reliable method does not warrant abandonment
of the reliable method.
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Analogously, even if we concede that previous empirically successful theories were not
approximately true, this does not give us license to assume that out current empirically
successful theories are untrue as well. Rather, we should view those past theories as the
aberration, as the errant lightening strike, while continuing infer to the best explanation with
confidence. This argument might be regarded as particularly effective if the previous realist
arguments were largely, yet not completely, successful in demonstrating that most abandoned
theories were approximately true.4 For the fewer incidents of genuinely non-truth-like yet
empirically successful theories, the more plausible it becomes that such theories are errant
lightening strikes rather than regular occurrence. And with fewer aberrations, the more
convincing the abductive reasoning which claims we should expect few such anomalies.
To conclude, the realist has a variety of weapons against the PMI. Besides appeals to the
explanatory power of realism, arguments that the historical sample size is insufficient to draw
serious conclusions about the future success of science, or arguments that there is significant
theoretical overlap between truly successful abandoned theories and current science, they might
also argue that abductive reasoning gives good reason to embrace realism even if some past
empirically successful theories were not approximately true. Given this, the anti-realist needs
independent reasons to explain why abductive reasoning should not be trusted to when
evaluating the truth-likelihood of current scientific theories. Until such a convincing argument is
made, we should regard the PMI as an insufficient motivation for abandoning realism.

4

It might also be argued that this argument becomes largely unnecessary if the previous realist arguments were
completely effective. If such was the case, there would be little motivation for a realist to appeal to abductive
reasoning to demonstrate the unlikeliness of problem cases, as there would be no problem cases to explain.
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